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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. CRIST and JACK L.
'VILLIAl\iS, d/b/a OAK HILL
SCHOOL,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
,Case No.

vs.

MAPLETON CITY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,
and PAUL CHERRINGTON,
Defendants and Appella.nts.

' 12558

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Respondents on a Petition,
first, against MAPLETON CITY, and then, on an
amended Petition, against PAUL CHERRINGTON,
the Mapleton City Building Inspector and Zoning Administrator, for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Ap1

pellants to issue a building permit for the alteration ut' a
dwelling to a school for boys, and upon the Counterclaim of the Appellant, l\LAPLETO.N CITY, for an
injunction against the Plaintiffs and Respondents enjoining and restraining them from converting, reconstructing, altering, occupying and using the dwelling i11
Mapleton City, as a school.

DISPOSITIO.N IN LCHVER COURT
The District Court, .T udge .:\laurice Harding, after
a hearing on an Order to Show Cause why the 'Vrit of
lVIandamus should not be issued, and af tcr receiving a
memorandum of argument and authorities of the Appellants herein, the answering memorandum of the He-spondents herein, and the reply memorandum of Appellants, issued a memorandum decision and signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and a "rrit
of l\1andamus ordering the Building Inspector and
Zoning Administrator of l\Iapieton City to issue and deliver to the Respondents the building permit applied for,
and ruled against the Appellants on the Counterclaim of
l\ilapleton City for an injunction.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to
the judgment of the trial
court affirmed and the 'Vrit of l\Iandamus upheld.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 23, 1970, Plaintiffs-Respondents doing business under the name of Oak Hill School, filed a
written application with Mapleton City to remodel a
residence in the A-2 Zone of Mapleton City as a private
school for boys. After initially informing the PlaintiffsRespondents that the building permit would be issued,
the Zoning Administrator declined to issue the permit.
(R-51-Answer to Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus #3, R-124-Transcript, page 6 lines 23-29)
On December 28, 1970, Plaintiffs-Respondents presented their application to the Zoning Administrator and
Planning Commission of Mapleton City. At the conclusion of the hearing thereon, the Respondents were informed that the Zoning Administrator and Planning
Commission were going to recommend to the City Council that the permit not be granted. (R-51-R-57)
On January 4, 1971, Respondents appeared before
the Mapleton City Council and requested approval of
their application. The matter was taken under advisement and the City Council immediately thereafter, sustained the action of the Zoning Administrator and Planning Commission in denying Respondents' application.
The Respondents then appealed the decision of the Zoning Administrator and the Planning Commission to the
Mapleton City Board of Adjustment. They did not ask
for an interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance, but asserted that the Zoning Ordinance gave them a right to
the building permit and that the decision of the Plan-
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ning Commission, the Zoning Administrator and Lhe
City Council was arbitrary. ( R-51-5 7)
The Board of Adjustment, on January 12, 1971,
after hearing the request of the Respondents, sustained
the actions of the Zoning .A.dministrator and Planning
Commission in denying the Respondents' appiication for
the building permit. They did not make an interpretation of the Zoning Ordinanees. ( R-51-57)
The Respondents then brought the petition for the
rit of .Mandamus to compel the issuance of the building permit on January 20, 1971.

'V

Respondents applied for a remodeling building permit in an A-2 Zone of .l\Iapleton City, which zone has as
a permitted use the establishment and conduct of schools.
They sought no change in the zoning ordinances and no
deviation from the zoning ordinances. The refusal of the
Appellants to issue the permit was predicated upon their
desire to exclude this particular school from the community. (R-124-Tr. p. 25 lines 7-16 and p. 26 lines 2628)

Appellants contend that an issue of fact material in
this case is that the Respondents commenced alteration
without the lmil<ling permit. The record and transcript
of the proceedings shows th:tt some construction was undertaken, but there was no evidence presented to the District Court as to the nmount of the construction or
whether or not this was in violation of any of the building codes. (R-124-Tr. p. 23, lines 7-18)
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Appellants also urged the Court, as a material fact,
that the Respondents are a partnership doing business
under an assumed name and at the time of the filing of
the proceedings had not complied with 42-2-5, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. This issue is not
material to the inquiry before the Court of the issuance
of the Writ of Mandamus or of the issuance of an injunction, since it relates to the carrying on of the business, which had not yet been undertaken at the time of
the application for the building permit. It also has no
application herein because the penalties for failure to
comply with such statute, as set forth in 42-2-10, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, are to prevent the
maintainance of a suit or action until the provision of the
Chapter have been complied with. This was not set up as
a defense or pleaded as a bar to further maintainance of
the action in this case by the Appellants and would only
serve to delay the proceedings.
Appellants also cite as a part of their Statement of
Facts that there is a similar facility known as Ettie Lee
Home for Boys within a half mile of the property for
which the remodeling permit was sought in this case, and
as support for that, their allegation in their Fifth Affirmative Defense. The allegations do not constitute a part of
the evidence and this is not established as a fact. The evidence presented to the Court controverts that Statement
of Fact and shows that the two facilities are not similar
and perform a different function. (R-124-Tr. p. 15
line 29 and continuing on p. 16, through line 14.)
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The Respondents amended Petition was heard by
the Court after an Order to Show Cause had been issued
by the Court; an initial hearing conducted; the denial of
the initial Petition and the filing; with leave of Court of
an amended Petition; and upon notice and full hearing.
Counsel was given adequate opportunity to present all
the evidence he had to present. (R-124-Tr. p. 20 lines
13-16) The only discretion exercised by the Court in
limiting the presentation of the case was limiting the oral
argument. (R-124-Tr. p. 20, lines 15-22, p. 22 line 30
continuing over to p. 23 to line 15, p. 24 lines 28 and 29.)
Appellants further contend at page seven of Appellants' Brief that the structural changes contemplated
were intended to create a "multi-family," "foster-family," care home dormitory-type facility for housing
twenty-six juvenile boys having drug, emotional and
other problems. The record shows in the memorandum
decision of the Court and in the testimony, that the permit was to establish a school. (R-124-Tr. p. 10 line 9,
p. 16 line 29, p. 17, lines 17-30, p. 18 line 1, p. 19 lines 1,
2 and 11-30, p. 20 lines 1-10)

STATEMENT OF POINTS

I
THE COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE
WRIT OF 1\1ANDA1\11US COl\IPELLING THE
APPELLANTS TO ISSUE THE BUILDING
PERMIT.
6

II
THE FILES AND PLEADINGS AND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS ESTABLISHED
RESPONDENTS INITIAL BURDEN OF
PROOF AS TO THE RIGHT TO THE BUILDING PERMIT AND THE COURT THEREAFTER CORRECTLY REQUIRED THE APPELLANTS TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN
OF PROOF TO GO FORWARD WITH ANY
PROOF THEY HAD THAT IT SHOULD NOT
BE GRANTED.
III
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO
GRANT THE INJUNCTION AND RESTAINING ORDERS REQUESTED BY APPELLANTS BECAUSE OF ITS RULING ON THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
ARGUMENT

I
THE COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE
WRIT OF MANDAMUS COMPELLING THE
APPELLANTS TO ISSUE THE BUILDING
PERMIT.
In this appeal the Court must consider whether or not
a Writ of Mandamus will lie under the facts of the case
that Resopndents have applied to Mapleton City for a
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remodeling building permit to remodel and adapt an
existing structure as a private school for boys. The area
is zoned A-2, which Zone permits the stablishment of
schools. The Zoning Administrator and Planning Commission, the City Council and the Board of . A.djustment
refused to issue the building permit.
As stated in 52 Am J ur 2d, Section 65:
".Mandamus is available iu a proper case to one
who has an immediate right to have a public act
done."
The procedure to be followed is outlined in Rule
65B ( b) ( 3) of the U tab Rules of Civil Procedure,
which reads as follows:
"Where the relief sought is to compel any inferior tribunal, or any corporation, board or person to perform an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station; or to compel the admission of a party
to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal or by such
corporation, board or person."
The zoning ordinance of Mapleton City provides
that the building inspector is the Zoning Administrator
and imposes upon him the duty to issue building permits
in accordance with the zoning ordinances. (Respondents
Exhibit #1, p. 79)
The area for which the building permit is sought is
zoned A-2 (R-124-Tr. p. 25 lines 7 to 9) The A-2 Zone
permits schools. (Exhibit #J, p. 49 and 50 at page 50)
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It is the contention of Respondents that having applied for a building permit for a school in a zone where
schools are a permitted use gives a clear and legal duty
to the Zoning Administrator, as the chargeable public
officer, to issue the building permit.

By and large, the Respondents agree with the citations of authorities and the principles pronounced by the
Appellant under Point I, sub-paragraph (a) setting
forth the criteria by which the Utah Supreme Court has
indicated a Writ of Mandamus may issue. The Utah
Court has of ten announced the principles under which a
writ of mandamus will issue, both before and since its
1916 ruling in KETCHUM COAL COMP ANY vs.
DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY, 48
Utah 342, 159 Pac. 737. In that case, the Court again reiterated that the writ will lie where there is a clear and
legal duty to do the act or thing demanded on the part
of the Court. In the case now before the Court, the Respondents filed application for a building permit and it
was refused. They then appeared before the Planning
Commission as directed by the Appellants, and it was ref used there. They then appeared before the City Council as directed by the Appellants and their request for
the building permit was refused again. They then appeared before the Board of Adjustment as directed by
the Appellants and their request was refused.
The rules in relation to the use of Mandamus in respect to building permits, is succinctly stated in 52 Am
J ur 2d, Section 216, which reads in part, as follows:
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"If the relator has exhausted all other available
remedie_s, mandamus lies in a proper case to compel the issuance of a building permit, if he shows
a clear right thereto and that there is a duty on
the part of the proper authorities to issue it, and
that they have authority to perform the act sought
to be compelled. The writ will issue if the refusal
is arbitrary, the applicant having complied with
all the valid formalities requisite to his right to
have the permit issued."
This is supported in the work on Zoing in 58 Am J ur,
Section 235 :
"In the case of a building or use permit refused
... Mandamus to compel the issuance of the permit ... is an appropriate remedy."

'V

And in fact, failure to apply for the
rit of Mandamus in a building permit case may preclude relief at a
later date, as shown by 58 Am J ur, Section 245 under
Zoning:
"Similarly, the existence of a right to a writ of
mandamus to compel the issuance of a building
permit, and a failure to assert such remedy, has
been regarded in some cases as sufficient basis for
denying the requested relief from the application
of a zoning restriction."
The Colorado Court in 1970, dealt with the use of
a Writ of Mandamus to compel public officials to perform a duty with this statement, from the case of
BOARD
COUNTY COl\llVIISSIONERS vs.
EDWARDS, 468 Pac. 2d 857:
"The judgment here, which includes a preemptory writ of mandamus, is justified where
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there has been a failure to perform a statutory
or a ref
to adhere to a statutory respons1b1hty ... It is well established that to compel
perfoi;nance of an act which the law specif 1cally enJoins upon public officers as a duty,
mandamus is the proper and effective remedy."
As is pointed out by the transcript of the proceedings, the Court, Judge Maurice Harding, sitting without a jury, well understood the limitations on the
Court to overrule and override the decision of a discretionary board, as is illustrated by the Courts' question of
Appellants' counsel at page twenty-five.
MR. NELSON: I think the critical issue here is
whether or not the Court, your Honor, in a mandamus
procedure can override the conclusion and opinion of a
deliberated body such as the Planning Commission and
the Board of Adjustments on what is a school.
THE COURT: It won't override a deliberated
body in this matter. The Court will not override it.
MR. NELSON: That is what we will address it to.
THE COURT: But if it's a clear, legal duty, then
the Court will override it.
MR. NELSON: I recognize that.
The Court correctly Ul)ed the Writ of Mandamus.
Having so ruled, that decision should not be overruled
unless the District Court manifestly abused its discretion.
The issue before the Court and granting of the Writ
of 1\!Iandamus is primarily a discretionary function of
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the District Court, as recently stated in 1969 by the .i\lontana Supreme Court:
"The granting of an injunction and a \Vrit of
are
of discretion resting in the
D1str1ct Court and will be sustained on appeal unless there is a showing of abuse of such discretion
on the part of the Court." ERIE vs. STATE,
STATE HIGH\VAY COMMISSION, 461
Pac. 2d 207.
The Appellants misinterpret the issue before the
Court since it is Respondents' contention that the Court
did not override a discretionary function of the Mapleton officials, and therefore correctly utilized the Writ
of Mandamus to compel that act which is enjoined upon
them by the ordinance of Mapleton City.
In sub-paragraph (b) of Point I, Appellants contend that the issuance of a building permit is a discretionary function and that the Court is in error in issuing a
1V rit of Mandamus in connection therewith. If as contended by the Appellants, the Zoning Administrator,
the Planning Commission and the Board of Adjustment
are empowered to interpret the zoning ordinance and the
meaning of the word "school," as contained therein, this
would be an unconstitutionally invalid ordinance. 13 Am
J ur 2d, Section 8, on Building Permits:
"In order to be valid, the ordinance must not
result in an unwarranted delegation of power to
officials of the municipality, nor attempt to confer upon them an unlimited discretion as to the
granting, ref using ?r 1:evocation o.f
Thus,
an ordinance proh1bitmg any bmldmg or any al12

te!ation, enlargement, or addition to any building
permi.ssion of the municipal authorities
is
where it makes the right depend on their
arbitrary decision, subject to no uniform standard
or rule of action, or where it would result in an
unjust discrimination, such as one based on race
prejudice." (Emphasis added)
Let us examine the particular ordinance questioned
in light of that matter. Chapter eight under the Zoning
Ordinances of Mapleton City provides, 8-1:
"The Building Inspector appointed under the
building code of Mapleton City is hereby designated as the Zoning Administrator who shall be
charged with the administration and enforcement
of this ordinance."
And8-2:
"No building or structure shall be constructed,
reconstructed, altered, or moved, nor shall the use
of any land be changed except after the issuance
of a permit for the same by the Zoning Administrator or other authorized officer."
And 8-4:
"It shall be the duty of the Zoning Administrator of Mapleton City to inspect or cause to be inspected all buildings in the course of construction
or repair. . . ."
The request for the building permit by Respondents
herein is sought in a A-2 Agricultural Zone, which sets
forth fifteen separate uses which are permitted uses within the Zone. Use eleven provides for schools, public parks
and playgrounds. If Appellants contention that the
Board and the Zoning Administrator are entitled to the
right to interpret the definition of "School" without re-

13

gard to criteria set forth in the ordinance or with other
uniform standards, but only upon the discretion of the
Board, then the Board would have authority to refuse to
grant a building permit for a school because the school
was octagon in shape, catered to one race of people only,
is operated by a particular religious faith, or any other
whim of the Zoning Administrator or Planning Commission hearing the matter at the time of the application filing. This would clearly be the very violation set forth in
13 AmJ ur2d, Section 8 given above as an unconstitutional grant of authority. It is Respondents contention
that there is no such grant of authority given; that
"school" in these ordinances must take its accepted terminology.
In the particular case before the Court, the basis for
refusal was the supposed discretionary right of the Mapleton City officials to decline the issuance of the building permit because the school in question caters to boys
having school problems in the public school system, and
providing for an intensified education of them.
The word "school" has been defined numerous times
in the law. A few of the cases only are cited here. In
STATE vs. LAUREL CREST ACADEMY, 198 Atlantic 2d 229, the Court indicated that a school according to American usage, more generally denotes collective
bodies of pupils in any place of instruction and under the
direction and discipline of one or more instructors. In
STATE ex rel. SHORELINE SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 412 vs. SUPERIOR COURT :F'OR
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KING COUNTY, 346 Pac. 2d 999, 55 Wash. 2d 177,
the Court indicated a school is an institution consisting
of a teacher and pupils, irrespective of age, gathered together for instruction in any branch of learning. In
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF MERCED
COUNTY vs. COTHRAN, 191 Pac. 2d 506-84 California App. 2d 697, the Court indicated the word
"school" is variously defined as an institutional place for
instruction, for education; a place for learned intercourse
and a place for acquiring knowledge and mental training, a place for the instruction of children; a place for instructions imparted to the young; an educational establishment.
The 1957 case of SCHWEIZER vs. BOARD OF
ZONING APPEALS, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 764, 766, 8
Misc. 2d 878, dealing with the particularities of a definition of a school in a zoning matter indicated:
"A 'school' is a place for instruction in any
branch or branches of knowledge; an establishment for imparting education." (State ex vs.
Peterman, 32 Indiana App. 665-70 NE 550)
"Anyplace of means of discipline, improvement,
instruction or training." (In re Sanders, 53 Kansas 191, 36 Pac. 2d 348, 23 LRA 603) The quote
went on and indicated Websters, as follows:
new International Dictionary, Second
Edition, defines a 'school' as 'a place of instruction in any branch or
of
an
establishment for impartmg education.
In a case similar to the case at bar, PEOPLE vs.
COLLINS, ( 1948) 83 NYS 2d 124, 191 Misc. 2d 53,
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wherein the factual circumstance was that the defendants had failed to register a pre-school age children's
school, and was attempting to maintain the same in a
residential A Zone.
"The definition of schools as contained in this
zoning ordinance is primarily the same as contained in most of the zoning ordinances in this section of the country. The value of pre-schools to
children can hardly be questioned by anyone
whose children have attended a well run school of
this nature. To limit the existence of such schools
to the definition given in the Education Law,
would mean that such schooling would be available only to children of parents in the higher income brackets and live in a larger center of population. It does not seem reasonable that such an
interpretation has been intended in the adoption
of most of the zoing ordinances in this section of
the country and this court cannot find that this
ordinance should be differently interpreted by
virtue of the fact that it was enacted for a rather
large village.
It is the opinion of this Court that the operations
carried on by the defendants are a school within
the meaning of the Zoning Ordinance of the Village of Port Chester and for that reason, the appeal is granted and the conviction reversed and
information dismissed."

A similar application of the use of school in a zoning
case is CITY OF YONKERS vs. HOROWITZ, et
al., cited on page twenty-nine of the Appellants' Brief.
An examination of this case will indicate and the Court
particularly stated, that if the business carried on there
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is either the keeping of a boarding hou_se or of a school,
it is no violation of the zoning ordinance in question. Examination of the testimony presented to the District
Court, as shown by the transcript of the proceedings
shows such a finding was made in this case. ( R.:.·t24Tr. p. 16 lines 26 continuing to p. 17 and 18 to line 1)
"Q MR. WILLIAMS, would you tell us what
your school staffing program and purpose and what your
outline in your words is for this school?

A What is exactly being done is that the students
are referred to us by private families at present, and the
support or tuition is paid by the private families in all
but one case. They receive some help.
We have, of course, in individuated academic
studies at which at present all our boys are tested thoroughly by Brigham Young University and catagorized
so material can be purchased for them to pursue the
courses of study individually. Then we have the balance
of the staff to support them within the program.
'Vhat happens in the present society is that the boys
get in trouble and they start going astray and there are
not adequate facilities to provide some sort of service,
and so the children either end up in a situation one of two
following ways. One is called over placement, that means
to say they are put in a locked-up situation for the lack
of a proper facility.
And the other kind of facility is when they are
underplaced, which means to say that the boys are placed
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in a foster home situation when they have no business
facility there because the facility in question does not
have the staffing or other provisions to maintain them.
So, we are trying to provide a private school similar
to Wasatch Academy or any number of schools in this
country that provide a situation for academic studies,
but at the same time provide the ancillary staff to maintain the child in the home until he can start making improvements.
Our planned length of stay is from three to six
months. We are not a home for boys. In no way are we
trying to be a home. 'Ve are a school. No boy there-and
it wouldn't be fair to question these boys- but I assure
you there is no boy in the residence that believes he is
there for any other purpose than academics.
(Page 18, lines 14 to 30)
Q What kind of staff do you provide at the present
time, and also in the future when you fully have the full
compliment of boys there?

A The school situation is two teachers for one classroom of fifteen boys.
And all the teachers will be certified. The school will
be certified by the Northwest Association, of which we
have tentative approval.
The principal of our school is Dr. Curtis Van Alfen
of Brigham Young University who is the Assistant Dean
of Education, and he is the one in charge of the academic
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program. That is not my professional capacity. And he
is getting us accredited with him.
You cannot become accredited before the school is
established. The school must be established and then they
send a team to your school and then it's determined
whether they will or will not certify you."
A significant case for the Court to note is the one

upon which the District Court predicated its judgment
and determination that this was a school. In the case of
WILTWYCK SCHOOL FOR BOYS, INC., vs.
PERRY, (1962) 182 NE 2d 268, 11 NYS 2d 182, 277
NYS 2d 655, the facts of the case indicate that the building permit was applied for to commence construction of
a school for treatment of emotionally disturbed delinquent, dependent or neglected boys. The application was
for a building permit in a residential zone which permitted public, elementary and high schools, and private
and parochial elementary and high schools. The Court
pointed out that all the boys in the Wiltwyck School are
referred because there is a mal-adjustment in their getting along in society and many need psychiatric care.
The Court said:
"Under the Mandate of our Constitution, and
in accordance with modern concepts of education,
our Legislature has wisely and dutifully provided
for special schools for (among others) orphans
(Education Law, art. 81), Indians (id., art. 83),
the deaf and blind (id., arts. 85, 87), as well as
physically and
handicapped and delinquent children (1d., art. 89). All these are
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schools despite the fact that the students require
special attention, and the last named are not mental hospitals, reformatories or prisons." (Emphasis added)
The Court went on to quote the lower Court in
saymg:
"In our view it cannot be argued successfully
that the care of convalescent children does not include their education, the fact being that the Legislature has ,,ordained their education to be comp ulsory ...
The Court went on and said:

"Having concluded that Wiltwyck School for
Boys is a school within the language of the Yorktown Zoning Ordinance, and that the decision of
the Zoning board to the contrary is arbitrary and
unreasonable . .. " (Emphasis added)
They thereupon ruled that the school was entitled
to their building permit.
Respondents contend that the determination by the
Zoning Administrator and the Planning Commission,
the City Council and the Board of Adjustment, that the
Oak Hill School is not a school within the definition of
the zoning ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable. In
his memorandum Decision, Judge Harding ruled, based
on the facts presented to the Court, that this was a school
and that the Respondents were entitled to the building
permit for which they had applied.
In Point I, sub-paragraph ( c), Appellants contend
that the Respondents have no clear right to the permit
and that the City has no duty to issue the same. As point-
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ed out above, the Appellants admit and the zoning ordinance provides that the proper usage in the A-2 zone
is the establishment of schools. Examination of the zoning ordinance of Mapleton City will show that the zone
classifications established by Mapleton City provide for
no schools to be established in Zones GC- I, CC-I and
SC-I; for academic vocational schools in Rand D Zone
'
for public schools in R-3, R-2, R-I-Il,R-I-A and for
schools without designation as to kind in R-A-2 and A-2.
The very verbage chosen in the zoning ordinance of
Mapleton City indicates that the limitations to public
schools or vocational and academic schools are not imposed in the A-2 zone and that there is no criteria by
which the City could determine as a discretionary function that this does not comply with the zoning ordinace
in the applications filed by the Respondents herein. In
Point I, sub-paragraph ( d) of Appellants' Brief, the
Appellants contend that the interpretation of the zoning ordinance is done as a whole. Though interpretation
of the statute must be taken as a whole, Appellants
fail to recognize that the definition given to a word
of particular meaning, as a school, is not an interpretation of the statute at all, but is an attempt to establish
a right in the Planning Commission, the City Council,
the Board of Adjustment arid the Zoning Administrator to interpret on an "after-the-fact" basis, those terms
which are in the ordinance to effect an exclusion of the
Respondents herein from the area.
Point I, (e) of the Appellants' Brief suggests to
the Court that the establishment of this facility is against
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the public interest. Respondents submit to the Court that
no testimony and no evidence was presented to the Court
showing the establishment of this facility to be against
any public interest, and in fact, the Memorandum Decision of Judge Harding illustrates the need for specialized types of schooling of the very nature that the
Respondents herein contemplate.
Appellants contend that there is a short distance
from the proposed facility, a home for delinquent boys,
which is contended to be similar to the facility sought to
be established. However, the evidence in the transcript
refutes this contention. Quoting from the transcript of
testimony, page 15 lines 29-30, page 16 lines l through
14:
"Q You are aware, are you not, .Mr. \Villiams, that
there is another facility similar to your facility located in
this same zone?
A No sir, I am not.
Q Are you familiar with the Ettie Lee Home for
Boys?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is a home in which juvenile boys are living
on the premises the same as yours, is it not?
A I don't know anything about the facility, sir. I
have never been there.

Q It's located within less than a half a mile of this
other facility, is it not?
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A The building has been pointed out to me. I know
that it's there, but it does not have anything to do-it's
not like our program, if that is the implication. It serves
a different function."
Appellants contend that the establishment of this
facility will tend towards breaching the public
however the Court specifically found otherwise in its
.Memorandum Decision and in its Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment rendered herein. The
Memorandum Decision (R-99) shows that the Court
looked to the public interest in this matter.
In Appellants' Brief, Point I (f), the Appellants
contend that the Respondents are before the Court without clean hands, however, in the determination of the
lower Court of this factual matter, no evidence was presented that such facts exist, but in fact, the Court's determination was that the withholding of the building permit was a wrongful, arbitrary and unreasonable act by
the Appellants herein.
By their argument in Point I (g), Appellants contend that the Resopndents have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law and therefore, are not entitled to the
equitable remedy of Writ of Mandamus. Rule 65 (b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the use
of the Writ of Mandamus as set forth above. In the encyclopedia text on the subject of mandamus, 52 Am Jur
Section 47, the writer has indicated with appropriate
case citations:

2d,
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"It is enough that the writ is an appropriate
and efficient remedy to compel the performance
of the duties sought to be enforced. Statute imposing particular duties on officials may authorize mandamus to enforce such duties and where
the legal right to have the duty in question peris determined,_ the writ will issue to compel
its performance notwithstanding that there may
be another remedy."

II
THE FILES AND PLEADINGS AND REQUEST FOR AD.MISSIONS ESTABLISHED
RESPONDENTS INITIAL BURDEN OF
PROOF AS TO THE RIGHT TO THE BUILDING PERMIT AND THE COURT THEREAFTER CORRECTLY REQUIRED THE APPELLANTS TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN
OF PROOF TO GO FORWARD 'VITH ANY
PROOF THEY HAD THAT IT SHOULD NOT
BE GRANTED.
The Court ruled and the record shows that the Respondents herein had sustained their burden of proof on
the amended petition for Writ of Mandamus. (R. 124Tr. p. 25 lines 7-19)
"THE COURT: Now, let me ask you: There is no
question about the zone in which this property lies, it
there?
MR. NELSON: There is no question that it is A-2.
The serious question is whether or not this qualifies as a
school.
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THE COURT: A-2 permits schools?
lVIR. JEFFS: That is the zoning ordinance.
THE COURT: There is not question that they
have got an absolute right to construct a school in A-2,
is that right?
lVIR. NELSON: That's right. But you have to read
the classification of the zone in its entirety to find the
intent and spirit of that particular zone classification,
Your Honor."
And again the Court dealt with the matter again.
Page 26 line 25 through page 27 line 6.
"THE COURT: Well, I think the burden is on
you now. You have admitted that the area is within the
particular zone, and that particular zone permits schools.
The burden is on you to show why a permit should not
be required.
MR. NELSON: But this is not a school.
THE COURT: Well, that is what you say. That
depends upon something else, perhaps. You show us .
.MR. NELSON: The prima facie burden of that
has already been shown in the fact that this facility, which
contemplates an overnight facility for the permanent
care and treatment of children or juvenilesTHE COURT:-permanent care and education."
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III
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO
GRANT THE INJUNCTION AND RESTAINING ORDERS REQUESTED BY APPELLANTS BECAUSE OF ITS RULING ON THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF :MANDAMUS.
Over the protest of Respondents' counsel herein,
the Appellants elected to proceed on their counterclaim
on the evidence that was entered in Court. (R-124-Tr.
p. 20 lines 10 through p. 21 line 1)
"MR. JEFFS: That's all.
MR. NELSON: That's all.
(Mr. Jack Williams left the witness stand)
MR. NELSON: Now, your Honor, my point in
calling this witnessT HE COURT: Do you have any more evidence?
MR. NELSON: No.
THE COURT: Do you want to make an argument?
MR. NELSON: I want to make an argument.
THE COURT: I suggest you submit it in writing,
then, because it's nearly noon and we have a heavy calendar this afternoon. I am not going to be able to give
you much time.
MR. NELSON: I would like to argue this verbally some time before anything is done, arnd I also want
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tu aryue the matter of the injunction, because we applied
for an injunction, Mapleton City, and it's evident right
now that he has gone right ahead with the alterations
and occupation.
THE COURT: I don't have this ca.Ye before me
right now.
l.VIR. NELSON: It's the same case, your Honor,
and it's a counterclaim in this same ca.Ye."
(R-124-Tr. p. 22 lines 24 through p. 23 line 10)
"MR. NELSON: I don't deny that. I am willing to
submit a memorandum on the matter, but I would like
to have time to argue it.
THE COURT: I would like to have a memorandum. I can read the memorandums on Saturdays or Sundays when I can't listen to you in Court.
i\IR. NELSON: JV ell, I am willing to submit it on
a memorandum.
MR. JEFFS: I am too. However, if we are submitting it on the Counterclaim, we haven't had any evidence produced as to the counterclaim. "\Ve are going to
produce some evidence.
MR. NELSON: We have evidence as to the counterclaim right here. He has admitted that he has gone
ahead with the construction and that he has occupied
the building.
THE COURT: Well, how much construction?
There is a certain minimum amount that wouldn't require a permit."
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(R-124-Tr. p. 25 lines 3-6, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
"MR. JEFFS: You will have to proceed with yo·ur
own memorandum as to your counterclaim.
MR. NELSON: Well, I will make that part of my
memorandum.
The only limitations placed upon Appellants herein
was the time for argument. The Court allowed their argument to be placed in a written memorandum which
was submitted to the Court dated the 25th day of March,
1971, and consisted of eighteen legal pages, and Answering Brief from the Respondents herein, and a Reply
Brief consisting of seven pages. Certainly counsel had
adequate opportunity to present his case, in addition to
which his contentions to the court was that there was adequate evidence to support his claim for an injunction in
the record from Mr. Williams, and further, that he desired to put on no further evidence with regard to the
injunction, but would present it on a written memorandum. An examination of his written memorandum shows
well that he did argue all of his contentions for the injunction prayed for in the counterclaim. The finding
by the Court that the Respondents herein were entitled
to a building permit, which was wrongfully refused to
them by the Appellants establishes the basis for denial
of the injunction requested by Appellants' counterclaim.
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CONCLUSION
At best, zoning ordinances and building restrictions
constitute a serious encroachment upon the rights of individuals to the free and unfettered use of their property. At worst, such zoning ordinances constitute an oppressive, unconstitutional invasion of the rights of free
men.
If the Appellants contentions are to prevail and the
Court is to rule that the Zoning Administrator and the
Planning Commission have a right, under the ordinance,
to define the word "school" as contained in the ordinance
on an "after-the-fact" basis, then holders of interests in
land in Mapleton will be at the arbitrary whim and decision of the City Council, the Board of Adjustment and
the Planning Commission, without any advance notice
as to the criteria that may be imposed upon them despite
the plain and uncomplicated language of the ordinances.

The Respondents herein desire to establish a school
for the assisting of boys in finding their place in society.
If Appellants are to prevail, they would be arbitrarily
and unreasonably excluded based upon the changing
posture of the Appellant boards, despite the plain statement of the zoning ordinance that schools are a permitted
use in this zone. Respondents submit to the Court that
they have established and shown to the District Court a
clear and unambiguous right to the issuance of the building permit and operation of this school in the A-2 zone,
wherein they are located, that the District Court made
such findings and issued the Writ of Mandamus in con-
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formity with the law and the statutes. That the decision
of the District Court should be affirmed, both as to the
issuance of the 'Vrit of Mandamus and as to the denial
of the injunctive relief sought by the Appellants.
Respectfully submitted,

M. DAYLE JEFFS of
JEFFS AND JEFFS
90 North 100 East

Provo, Utah

Attorneys for Respondents
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